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Abstract
I cryptanalyze the pairing-free digital signature scheme of Islam et al. which is proven secure against “adaptive chosen message attacks”. I
introduce this type of forgery to analyze their scheme. Furthermore, I comment on general security issues that should be considered when making
improvements on their scheme. My security analysis is also applicable to other digital signatures designed in a similar manner.
c⃝ 2015 The Korean Institute of Communications Information Sciences. Production and Hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Certificateless public-key cryptography solves the certificate
management problem in traditional public-key cryptography,
and solves the key-escrow problem in identity-based public-
key cryptography. There are numerous certificateless signature
schemes [1–8]. designed for different applications. To avoid
bilinear pairing operations, Islam and Biswas [9] recently
proposed a pairing-free certificateless digital signature scheme
using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). They also proved that
their scheme was secure “against adaptive chosen-message and
identity attacks” in the random oracle model. In this paper, I
analyze the security of Islam et al.’s scheme and demonstrate
that it is not secure even though it is proven secure against
“adaptive chosen-message and identity attacks”. Furthermore,
I comment on general security issues that should be considered
when making improvements on their scheme. The security
of other similar schemes can be checked using the same
techniques, I employed in our study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss the security problem in Islam et al.’s [9]
scheme. Section 3 presents the security heal. Finally, Section 4
concludes the paper.
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Adversary A can forge a valid signature on m by replacing
the public key.
• After obtaining (IDS, RS), A randomly selects dA, xA ∈ Z∗q ,
computes PA = xAP , H0(IDS, RS, PA), P ′pub = (dAP −
RS)H0−1 and replaces master public key Ppub with P ′pub
and IDS’s PS with PA so that dAP = RS + H0(IDS,
RS, PA)Ppub ′ holds.
• A sets (DA, xA) as full private key of the signer where
DA = (dA, RS), and sets (PA, RS) as the full public key.
• To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, A selects yA ∈R Zq∗, com-
putes YA = yAPA, hA = H1(m, IDS, RS, YA) and tA =
H2(m, IDS, PA, YA).
Finally A computes σA = xAyA− (tAxA+ hAdA) mod q
and outputs the signature (σA, YA) on the message m.
Because YA = yAPA = yAxAP , hA = H1(m, IDS, RS, YA),
and tA = H2(m, IDS, PA, YA).
Thus, σAP = YA−tAPA−hA(RS+H0(IDS, PA, RS)Ppub ′).
Therefore, the generated signature can pass the verification,
and A generates a signature successfully.
3. Formal proof to heal the security
When designing a signature protocol such as the one
described above, the system public key Ppub should be hashed
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to heal the security in [9] is given as follows.
• When executing Partial-Private-Key-Extract in [9], if Ppub is
hashed in H0, private key part di is computed as di = (ri +
xH0(IDi , Ri , Pi , Ppub)) mod q so that the user can validate
their partial private key tuple Di = (di , Ri ) by checking the
equation di P = Ri + H0(IDi , Ri , Pi , Ppub)Ppub.
• Now, after obtaining (IDS, RS), if A attempts to forge the
signature in the same manner described in the previous
section, it then randomly selects dA, xA ∈ Z∗q , computes
PA = xAP , H0(IDS, RS, PA, Ppub), P ′pub = (dAP − RS)
H0−1, and replaces master public key Ppub with P ′pub and
IDS’s PS with PA.
• For the verification, one checks the equation dAP =
RS + H0(IDS, RS, PA, P ′pub)P ′pub, which will not hold.
Therefore, forgery is not possible.
One can check the security of other proposed schemes that
employ designs similar to the one described above.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Islam et al.’s
pairing-free certificate-less digital signature scheme is not se-
cure against some forgery types even though it is proven
secure against “adaptive chosen-message attacks”. Furthermore,we commented on security issues to present a counter-
measure.
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